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INTRODUCTION 
Richard Posner was certainly the most able judge in the his-
tory of tort law and in the development and deployment of law 
and economics. Tort law is at the center of hundreds of Posner’s 
judicial decisions, the best known of which concern the choice be-
tween negligence and strict liability. But mastery is not the same 
as influence, whether for an academic or a judge. Unlike  
Benjamin Cardozo, the most influential judge in the field of torts, 
Posner did not have the opportunity to influence law on a state 
court before moving to the federal bench. Moreover, as noted by 
Professor Douglas Baird, Posner operated in a post–Erie Railroad 
Co v Tompkins1 environment, in which federal judges hearing di-
versity cases might constrain themselves, knowing that state 
courts could reverse and insist that they had been misconstrued.2 
Inasmuch as I doubt Posner would have been so easily con-
strained, I prefer to emphasize that by the time he was appointed 
to the judiciary, many of the significant innovations in tort law, 
including employer liability and products liability, had already 
been introduced by earlier courts and legislatures. These sources 
of law had brought about a multistate switch from contributory 
to various forms of comparative negligence. More fundamentally, 
earlier lawmakers had chosen negligence, rather than strict lia-
bility, as the central principle of tort law—in contrast to contract 
law, in which strict liability dominates.3 Despite these hurdles, 
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 1 304 US 64 (1938). 
 2 Douglas G. Baird, Unlikely Resurrection: Richard Posner, Promissory Estoppel, 
and The Death of Contract, 86 U Chi L Rev 1037, 1038 (2019) (suggesting that when  
Posner sat in diversity he was not in a position to “introduce striking new ideas or boldly 
reshape existing law”). 
 3 But see generally George M. Cohen, The Fault That Lies within Our Contract Law, 
107 Mich L Rev 1445 (2009) (showing hidden elements of fault in contract law). 
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Posner’s impact in answering the question of negligence versus 
strict liability is greater than that of any judge in the last seventy-
five years, and he eclipses both Judge Learned Hand and Judge 
Guido Calabresi, another founding star of law and economics.4 
Posner illuminated and championed the negligence principle dur-
ing his academic career, and his understanding and intuitions 
about the negligence rule continued developing during his career 
as a judge. Earlier judges may have contemplated the division of 
labor between negligence and strict liability, but Posner refined 
this choice in ways that reflected a deep understanding of the 
choice between the two rules, and he did so with language that 
has guided other judges. His immediate influence might be de-
scribed as incremental rather than monumental, but it is bol-
stered by the fact that he advanced a law-and-economics perspec-
tive in a manner that eliminated conceptual competitors. 
The influence of Posner on torts will not be matched in the 
future. Posner’s tort law decisions—distinctive, clear, and bril-
liant as they are—often expand or contract inherited principles. 
Significant decisions had already been made by earlier judges and 
legislatures, and these constrained Posner as well as his contem-
poraries and successors. His failure to shake the roots of tort law 
also reflects the decline of the common law over the last half cen-
tury. He was part of an era in which the judiciary’s energy and 
imagination were directed at constitutional law and questions of 
statutory interpretation rather than at any large-scale and novel 
transformation of torts, contracts, and other private law subjects. 
If the common-law era had a longer life, Posner might have redi-
rected products liability, altered the structure of medical mal-
practice, and determined the scope of the least-cost-avoider prin-
ciple. Had Posner not resigned from the judiciary at age seventy-
eight, it is conceivable that he would have decided important 
cases involving autonomous vehicles or assigned the costs of 
adapting to and stalling climate change, and in this way influ-
enced at least one country’s reaction to this threat. Instead, these 
areas are destined to be guided by legislatures and administrative 
agencies rather than by confident and aggressive judges, whether 
 
 4 To be fair, Posner joined the judiciary thirteen years earlier than Judge Calabresi. 
The great Judge Hand is one of the most cited judges of all time, owing to his many con-
tributions, including the Hand formula, which comes close to a statement of the negligence 
principle that dominates tort law. Of course, that principle predates Judge Hand. See 
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 194 (Wolters Kluwer 9th ed 2014) (pointing 
to specific cases using a cost-benefit analysis that were decided long before the Hand  
formula was articulated). 
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in the federal or state systems. As Professor Frederick Schauer 
has observed, the present age of lawmaking is one of specificity, 
of rules rather than standards, and with more extensive constitu-
tions and statutes.5 In the United States, with an old and rela-
tively pithy Constitution, followed over time by active legislators 
and administrators inclined to respond to every perceived prob-
lem, judges are inevitably focused on extending constitutional 
rights and interpreting statutes. They are often appointed be-
cause of their perceived views about the administrative state and 
constitutional law rather than their experience with private law 
matters. They are neither inclined nor equipped to reformulate 
tort law. 
Part I begins by describing tort law’s choice between a 
negligence and a strict liability approach. Part II then explores 
some of Posner’s best-known torts decisions in order to assess his 
impact and explain why he did not exert even greater influence—
despite his willingness to describe facts and real disputes with 
Cardozo-like creativity.6 Part II offers a law-and-economics twist 
to the question of why the common law of torts has declined in 
importance. Part III extends the idea to the common law more 
generally and argues that Posner’s opportunity to boldly 
refashion tort law came too late for some matters and too early 
for others. 
I.  THE CHOICE BETWEEN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY 
Posner’s obvious contribution was to push efficiency consid-
erations to the center of tort (and other areas of) law. Beginning 
with his 1973 book Economic Analysis of Law, now in its ninth 
edition, he argued that as a positive matter, the common law, and 
tort law in particular, was largely efficient.7 His discussion of the 
choice between strict liability and negligence and his explanation 
 
 5 Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 Ariz St L J 765, 769 (2004). 
 6 The strength of some of Cardozo’s best-known opinions stems from his willingness 
to bend the facts. Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co, for example, ignores the small 
chance that Helen Palsgraf could have located the individual who carried the fireworks, 
or “bomb,” as Cardozo calls it. He also mischaracterizes the events leading to Palsgraf’s 
injury to ensure that a reader construes any harm as exceedingly unforeseeable. 162 NE 
99, 99–100 (NY 1928). Cardozo himself acknowledged, with respect to the writing of opin-
ions, that “one must permit oneself, and that quite advisedly and deliberately, a certain 
margin of misstatement.” Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 43 (Chicago 
1990), quoting Benjamin Cardozo, Law and Literature, in Margaret E. Hall, ed, Selected 
Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 339, 341 (Fallon 1947). 
 7 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 31–33 (cited in note 4). 
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of why courts did not take activity levels into account in assessing 
negligence—topics later expanded upon and formalized by oth-
ers—are remarkable for their clarity and insight.8 As a judge,  
Posner brought these insights to the case law and then, often be-
cause of the clarity and openness of his writing, to law school 
courses. Through his skilled writing as both an academic and 
judge, his view of law, once radical in the eyes of lawyers and legal 
academics, became widely accepted, though often resented and 
disputed. It may be that other judges feared that they would look 
foolish if they created conflicts with Posner’s Seventh Circuit de-
cisions. Posner got to lawmaking before Calabresi and other po-
tential rivals, and he wrote with enough reach and authority that 
it would have been difficult for any judge to undo his influence on 
the language and values of tort law. Academics occasionally took 
issue with him,9 but he ignored or dismissed competitors, such as 
the civil recourse theorists, who sought to define and resolve pri-
vate law disputes differently.10 
That Posner’s influence falls short of Cardozo’s is in part be-
cause he arrived late on the scene and generally did not try to 
undo settled law, whether made by judges or legislators. As noted 
earlier, legislatures and agencies have reduced the reach of pri-
vate law judges. In the case of Posner and tort law, there was a 
second constraint on judicial influence. Prior to his judicial ap-
pointment in 1981, he had encouraged a generation of law-and-
economics scholars, including Professors Steven Shavell and Alan 
Sykes, to analyze the efficiency of alternative arrangements in 
 
 8 See id at 205–09 (cited in note 4). See, for example, Steven Shavell, Strict Liability 
versus Negligence, 9 J Legal Stud 1, 6–8 (1980). Shavell and others were surely influenced 
by John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J Legal Stud 323, 338–
43 (1973). 
 9 See, for example, J.M. Balkin, Book Review, Too Good to Be True: The Positive 
Economic Theory of Law, 87 Colum L Rev 1447, 1463–64 (1987) (poking holes in some of 
Posner’s rational actor assumptions, including the fact that not all tort victims sue); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan L Rev 767, 779–81 (2001) (criticizing 
Posner’s cost-benefit approach to free speech); Jed Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 Stan 
L Rev 753, 755 (2002). 
 10 See Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 
88 Ind L J 469, 471–75 (2013). Civil recourse theory, as popularized by Professors John 
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, is the view that the law of torts is “a law of wrongs and 
recourse” among private individuals rather than a means for allocation of losses. John C.P. 
Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex L Rev 917, 918 (2010).  
Posner contrasts this theory with realist and economic approaches to tort law, character-
izing it as predominately moralistic. Posner, 88 Ind L J at 470 (cited in note 10). 
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tort law.11 Many breakthroughs in tort theory were thus influ-
enced by Professor (rather than Judge) Posner, who may have 
scared off serious dissent because of his expertise and withering 
analyses, but who encouraged those who were comfortable with 
his method to add to the general understanding of law and eco-
nomics. Posner may therefore deserve indirect rather than direct 
credit for some important developments in the law. Finally,  
Posner was less (directly) influential than he might have been be-
cause he understood and taught that alternative rules available 
in tort law were often reasonable, as there were a number of ways 
to promote economic efficiency. He had no reason or inclination to 
turn the field upside down when it had already found its way, 
through common law judging or market pressures, to one of sev-
eral reasonable rules. Posner himself understood and explained 
the sense or genius of these inherited rules.12 
Still, there were (and remain) areas of tort law that Posner 
could have influenced because they were unsettled or ripe for 
clearer rules. The most important of these was the extent to which 
strict liability ought to intrude on areas previously governed by a 
rule requiring plaintiff to show that a defendant had been negli-
gent (and caused the defendant’s loss) in order to recover for a 
loss.13 Negligence was, and remains, the fundamental rule of the 
system, but just as an earlier generation had brought strict liabil-
ity to bear on the manufacturers of consumer products, there re-
mains room for other matters to be governed by—or freed from—
strict liability. Some economists were quick to favor strict liabil-
ity, albeit with a complete defense of contributory negligence,14 
 
 11 See generally Shavell, 9 J Legal Stud 1 (cited in note 8). See also Alan O. Sykes, 
Strict Liability versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor, 74 U Chi L Rev 1911, 1931 (2007). 
 12 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 300–01 (cited in note 4). 
 13 Conventional tort law is based on the negligence principle, though products liabil-
ity, employer liability, hazardous activities, and several other areas are governed by strict 
liability. For example, a leaking, exploding, or otherwise defective automobile that causes 
injury makes the manufacturer (or seller) liable even if it can be shown that the product 
was not negligently made. If, for example, one in a thousand of these products is defective 
because of a flaw in a metal component or some imperfect glass, and these defects could 
not be discovered except at inefficiently high cost, there is liability under strict products 
liability assuming that causation can be shown. 
 14 See generally Simon Rottenberg, Liability in Law and Economics, 55 Am Econ Rev 
107 (1965). Rottenberg regards strict liability as “The Rule of Economics” as opposed to a 
fault-based rule, which is denigrated as “The Rule in Law.” Id at 107–08. However, he uses 
the example of international air transportation to make the case for liability regardless of 
fault without recognizing that passengers are unlikely to be able to vary their activities 
once aboard. Id at 110–14. But see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in 
a Market Setting, 70 Am Econ Rev 363, 365–66 (1980) (recognizing imperfections of both 
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while Posner generally celebrated negligence in his academic 
work and then in his judicial decisions. When he did expand the 
use of strict liability, he was thoughtful and cautious.15 The con-
ventional law-and-economics affection for strict liability had also 
become the everyman’s intuition; most observers are quick to fa-
vor corporate and other liability on grounds that it will cause well-
financed actors to take the cost of accidents into account. Only 
those well-tutored in law and economics come to see that  
precaution-taking is likely to be unchanged if strict liability ra-
ther than negligence is the governing rule.16 Posner’s influence in 
this important area of tort law is subtle and easily unrecognized. 
Under the conventional view, the problem with a negligence 
rule is that it does not fully take activity-level effects into ac-
count.17 It is easier to think about joint care with respect to taking 
precautions than it is with respect to engaging in activities—and 
this is especially true if one thinks about certain kinds of acci-
dents. Consider for example A, the owner of a car, who drives per-
fectly well on a rainy day but slides and crashes into another ve-
hicle, owned by B, or into a pedestrian, C. If the injured party 
 
rules in the long run, but showing why strict liability is preferable in the short run with a 
fixed number of entrants). To be sure, some law professors also preferred strict liability, 
though not always for the reasons discussed in the text. See, for example, Guido Calabresi, 
Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L J 656, 668–70 (1975); Richard A. Epstein, 
Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J Legal Stud 165, 174–85 
(1974); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J Legal Stud 151, 152–60 (1973); 
Guido Calabresi and Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale 
L J 1055, 1075–76 (1972); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv 
L Rev 537, 543 (1972). See also Keith N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability, 4 
Rev L & Econ 153, 154, 162–65 (2008), which begins with an observation about economists’ 
preference for strict liability and follows with an analysis of when that preference is  
misplaced. 
 15 See, for example, Navarro v Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd, 117 F3d 1027, 1029 (7th 
Cir 1997) (describing the relevance of manufacturer negligence in cases of strict liability 
in contrast to prior Illinois case law); Bethlehem Steel Corp v United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, 782 F2d 645, 652 (7th Cir 1986) (approving the EPA’s rejection of an 
activity-level-based proposal regulating Indiana steel production). See also generally  
Konradi v United States, 919 F2d 1207 (7th Cir 1990); Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co v 
American Cyanamid Co, 916 F2d 1174 (7th Cir 1990). 
 16 See Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications 
for Tort and Contract Law, 11 S Ct Econ Rev 125, 137 (2003). 
 17 Under a negligence standard, actors will be held liable only if they are found to 
have neglected cost-justified precautions in their activity and a wrong resulted; under a 
strict liability standard, actors will be held liable for any harms resulting from the under-
lying activity. As a result, a strict liability standard may discourage actors from engaging 
in the underlying activity, whereas a negligence standard will encourage precaution- 
taking but will not substantially impact activity levels. See Shavell, 9 J Legal Stud at 19 
(cited in note 8); Polinsky, 70 Am Econ Rev at 366 (cited in note 14); Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-
Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J Legal Stud 319, 320 (1992). 
2019] Richard Posner and the Negligence Principle 1143 
 
cannot identify any negligence on A’s part, there is no liability 
and no recovery against A. There has developed a strong pre-
sumption of negligence for car accidents, so it might be useful to 
substitute dogs for cars: while walking his dog, B’s dog snarls, and 
A’s dog leaps out of control and injures B’s or knocks over a pe-
destrian, C. Economists have been quick to point out that perhaps 
A had no great need to be out that day (or no need to have a dog 
or car on a city street in the first place). A’s behavior might have 
been selfish and inefficient because nothing encourages A to take 
account of the likelihood of injury to B or C so long as A is 
nonnegligent in his precaution-taking. If law would allow the jury 
to evaluate A’s reason for driving or dog-walking, it might find 
that A’s activity was itself negligent, or somehow antisocial. With 
fewer cars on the road, there would be fewer injuries and, to com-
plicate things, less pollution. For the most part, law does not en-
tertain such arguments about activity levels, perhaps for the 
same reason that it does not require A to show that owning a car 
or dog was in fact socially useful. Economists and environmental-
ists do take activity levels seriously,18 but it is widely thought that 
a negligence rule does not capture activity levels properly. 
One might expect Posner and other law-and-economics ad-
herents to favor strict liability, here and elsewhere, on the ground 
that it (ostensibly) forces the driver, for example, to take all the 
externally imposed costs of car ownership into account. Posner 
could have moved much of tort law to a strict liability regime, al-
beit with a contributory negligence defense in the mix; judges and 
commonly held moral intuitions would restrict or deny recovery 
by B if B jumped into harm’s way from between parked cars. A 
similar argument in favor of strict liability brought about a dra-
matic increase in liability for environmental harms in both judi-
cial and legislative lawmaking during the same period. Closer to 
one of the themes advanced here, Cardozo moved products liabil-
ity law away from the doctrinal requirement of privity—which  
often immunized the manufacturer of a consumer product—to 
strict liability.19 Posner could have done the same for other slices 
of tort law. 
In fact, the common intuition in favor of strict liability as a 
means of accounting for externalized costs is wrong, or at least 
misleading. Posner understood this, to be sure, but he doubted a 
 
 18 See David Gilo and Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing 
Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L Rev 277, 289 (2009). 
 19 See generally MacPherson v Buick Motor Co, 111 NE 1050 (NY 1916). 
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court’s ability to calculate the optimal level of activity to be un-
dertaken by likely “victims.”20 Thus, it is easy to think of A driving 
less if A is encouraged by a liability rule to consider risks to others 
by thinking of the possibility of injuring B or C, despite A’s careful 
driving, once he chooses to drive at all. It is far more difficult to 
think about C’s optimal amount of walking or of walking in dan-
gerous places.21 Indeed, there is the matter of calculating the 
other activities in which C might partake if C is discouraged from 
walking at a given time or in a given place, and those too might 
cause injuries. Consider in this regard Posner’s decision in  
Konradi v United States,22 a case that is especially important be-
cause it did not go further in the direction of strict liability.23  
Posner’s decision, along with his fame and expertise, likely re-
strained other judges from doing more on the basis of a misguided 
intuition. Returning to the first case imagined previously, in 
which A damages B’s vehicle, the problem with holding A strictly 
liable, in order to get the right amount of driving or car ownership 
on his part, is that doing so takes away some of B’s incentive to 
drive less. Attaching strict liability to one party will normally en-
courage an activity by the other. Generations of law students 
have had trouble with this point, perhaps because they think of 
the injured party as a pedestrian, depicted here by C, rather than 
as another driver. It is hard to see how a mere pedestrian will 
change her activity level, which is to say her volume and path of 
walking, simply because full recovery from a negligent driver is 
unavailable if this walking is socially imperfect. Excessive driving 
by B is easier to comprehend than excessive walking. 
The idea that a strict liability rule against A might lead to 
inefficient behavior by another party who must contemplate the 
prospect of recovery from A is not much of a problem in the case 
of most consumer products. The consumer will face a higher price 
for a good once the manufacturer and seller anticipate strict lia-
bility. This higher price discourages the likely victim’s activity; 
more precisely, it will discourage car and dog ownership, but it will 
not influence the amount and location of driving or dog-walking. 
 
 20 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 206–10 (cited in note 4). 
 21 Nor is insurance any help. The owner of a car gets some information from insur-
ance premiums because driving can be measured, but walking is not easily verified by an 
insurer. 
 22 919 F2d 1207 (7th Cir 1990). See notes 35–41 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of the case.  
 23 See id at 1210–11. 
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With respect to some activities, it is plausible that it is the 
negligence rule that best controls activity levels. Consider B’s and 
C’s behavior as well as A’s. The two car owners, B and A, do not 
know which of them will be injured in a potential crash nor which 
would be more likely to have caused an accident in a nonnegligent 
fashion. As such, the negligence rule does control their activity 
levels, just as strict liability does, because each party knows that 
the likelihood of an accident in which one will be unable to collect 
from the (nonnegligent) injurer is greater on a rainy day, for ex-
ample, and certainly greater than if one walks or takes a train 
instead of driving to the intended destination. But when A and C 
are considered, a strict liability rule is inefficiently one-sided, or 
shortsighted, because it addresses A’s behavior and not C’s.24 
Strict liability, through which parties who can expect to be in-
jured do not pay upfront for expected recoveries, ignores the fact 
that it takes two to tort. The typical owner of a car does not know 
whether he or she will injure or be injured on the road. Still, tort 
law has external effects; the extension of strict liability to cover 
injured nonpurchasers raises the price of cars and toaster ovens 
but does not directly affect those who may benefit from strict lia-
bility without paying for it as purchasers.25 
The most obvious way for a strict liability system to take B’s 
excessive driving and C’s unnecessary or careless walking into ac-
count would be to expand the reach of contributory and compara-
tive negligence to cover everyone’s antisocial activity level. But as 
Posner recognized, this asks too much of courts and would raise 
the administrative cost of the (strict liability and negligence) sys-
tem yet further, as parties would have to litigate the difficult 
question of B’s and C’s optimal levels and styles of driving and 
walking.26 We have already seen some of the complications that 
would arise if courts tried to calculate C’s efficient level of walking. 
Another way to take both parties’ behavior and activity levels 
into account would be to require both to pay in the event of an 
accident, under a rule that might be called “double strict liability.” 
The obvious moral hazard, or undesirable effect on activity levels, 
 
 24 This argument is suggested in William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The 
Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 Ga L Rev 851, 911 (1981). See also Shavell, 9 J 
Legal Stud at 7 (cited in note 8). 
 25 See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 
NC L Rev 643, 647 (1978). 
 26 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 200 (cited in note 4). 
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under such a rule could in theory be overcome by having both par-
ties’ payments made to the state or to a designated charity. Alter-
natively, a third party could pay in advance for the right to these 
payments.27 Even less popular would be an economist’s dream: 
law could demand cash from both parties and have some or all of 
the currency destroyed. The point is to avoid the moral hazard of 
someone hoping to be injured in order to collect double payment 
while fully deterring antisocial behavior. The important idea is 
that all parties are encouraged to drive both carefully and moder-
ately. Needless to say, no court or legislature has been inclined to 
try either of these fanciful, academic solutions.28 
It is worth repeating that strict liability does not misfire 
when it raises the cost of goods in anticipation of its application. 
These higher prices naturally control the activity level of most of 
those likely to be injured. The genius of negligence is that it im-
poses at least a partial activity-level effect on all parties, includ-
ing C and passersby who are injured and did not pay for a good. 
It is fair to say that it is not obvious whether to prefer negligence 
or strict liability, and the prevalence of negligence is probably 
best understood on administrative grounds; both rules require in-
vestigation into parties’ behavior, but a strict liability rule obvi-
ously requires more inquiries into damages. More interesting, I 
think, is the possibility that there is a universally held intuition 
that negligent people should pay for the harms they cause and 
then a fairly common intuition, perhaps (ignorantly) redistribu-
tive at its root, that businesses should pay for the harm their 
products cause even if there is no proof of negligence. The pockets 
of strict liability that are observed might conform to ethical sen-
timents as well as consideration of when one party or the other 
can vary activity level or think ahead about likely accidents.29 
The argument can also be seen in terms of Calabresi’s famed 
least-cost-avoider principle30—easily mistaken for a brief in favor 
of strict liability.31 Imagine that X, a guest at a hotel, is injured 
 
 27 Versions of this clever idea are explored in Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Total 
Liability for Excessive Harm, 36 J Legal Stud 63, 75–77 (2007). 
 28 An optimist might say that activity levels are controlled by such things as conges-
tion pricing, gas taxes, and tolls, but these are surely much lower (at least in the United 
States) than required for this purpose. 
 29 Insurance here is also not of help, as previously discussed in note 21. 
 30 See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis  
136–38 (Yale 1970). 
 31 See, for example, Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest 
Cost-Avoider, 78 Va L Rev 1291, 1338–39 (1992). 
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by pollution encountered while swimming in a lake bordered by 
the hotel. Multiple factories contribute to the pollution. Even if 
the hotel owner is not a negligent polluter, it might be held liable 
as the party best able to warn X against swimming. I think  
Calabresi would favor this result on least-cost-avoider grounds, 
which he might link to his proposed “reverse Learned Hand” 
rule,32 even though liability might reduce X’s own ability to learn 
about unsafe swimming areas or lead X to engage in more swim-
ming than is optimal. If swimmers are informed of the risk by a 
factory or by the hotel, but X swims anyway, it is unlikely that 
Calabresi would deny recovery even though it is X who is now 
likely the least-cost avoider. In any event, if safe swimming is a 
valuable activity that attracts guests, then in a simple application 
of the Coase Theorem33 it should be noted that the hotel owner 
might bargain with the nearby factories to engage in less pollu-
tion. But this is a difficult set of bargains; the hotel may be the 
least cost avoider in some sense, but it is unlikely to know much 
about the precaution costs of the various factories. In practice, the 
problem is dealt with by the legislature and by administrative 
agencies, but the point is that a strict liability rule applied to the 
hotel, or to any of the factories, is unlikely to yield an efficient 
result. Activity levels are interactive, and a rule that limits liabil-
ity to parties that are demonstrably negligent might be more 
likely to bring about optimal activity levels by all concerned. 
There are of course other reasons to favor either negligence 
or strict liability. The latter saves courts and parties the cost of 
litigating negligence, although they will still need to litigate the 
question of contributory negligence. On the other hand, a strict 
liability rule necessarily comes with the cost of calculating dam-
ages in a greater number of cases.34 Posner’s opinions rarely turn 
on these questions, and there is no reason to assess them here. 
 
 32 Calabresi and Hirschoff, 81 Yale L J at 1059 (cited in note 14). A “reverse Learned 
Hand test” is one in which the injurer bears the cost of an accident unless the victim knew 
or should have known that accident avoidance by her was cheaper than the cost of the 
accident. 
 33 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 6–8 (1960). 
 34 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven 
Shavell, eds, 1 Handbook of Law & Economics 142, 155 (Elsevier 2007). 
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II.  POSNER’S APPROACH TO NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY 
One of Posner’s best-known opinions is Konradi, a case that 
involved early-morning negligence by a rural mailman (as the let-
ter carrier was called in the case) who, while driving to work, 
killed Glen Konradi.35 The plaintiff sought to recover from the 
wrongdoer’s employer, the United States, but respondeat supe-
rior, or vicarious liability, is traditionally restricted to work done 
by the employee in the scope of employment and for the benefit of 
the employer. Commuting to work is normally thought to be too 
removed from the scope of employment for liability to be imposed 
on the employer. Exceptional cases involve an employee who was 
driving home from a client meeting at lunchtime and one who 
used the employer’s vehicle.36 In his decision in Konradi, expand-
ing strict liability to the employer, Posner quickly turns to the 
likelihood that strict liability would bring about a more efficient 
activity level.37 It is one of the few judicial decisions that notices 
or has the courage to think about the choice between negligence 
and strict liability on activity-level grounds. Posner suggests that 
liability might lead to more efficient dispatching of salesmen38 or 
perhaps more efficient rules about working from home. But did 
Posner also consider the likelihood that strict liability on an em-
ployer might lead to excessive driving by an employee, who may 
be freed from liability when a plaintiff chooses to sue the employer 
due to a sympathetic jury or the employee’s inability to pay? 
There is also the question of whether Posner considered the ac-
tivity level of drivers who might expect to be hit by postal employ-
ees on their way to and from work. Finally, there is the danger 
that strict liability will push employers to spend excessive time 
and energy on indemnification provisions in their contracts with 
employees. 
It is significant that in Konradi, Posner does not attempt to 
create a rule of strict employer liability for all commuters. By lim-
iting the decision to an employee who drives for a living,39 Posner 
gives other drivers little reason to think that they can drive more 
and collect from another. He says: 
 
 35 Konradi, 919 F2d at 1208. 
 36 See State v Gibbs, 336 NE2d 703, 705–06 (Ind App 1975); Gibbs v Miller, 283 NE2d 
592, 594–95 (Ind App 1972). 
 37 See Konradi, 919 F2d at 1210–11. 
 38 Id at 1211. 
 39 Id at 1212. 
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If it is true that one objective of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior is to give employers an incentive to consider changes 
in the nature or level of their activities, then “scope of em-
ployment” can be functionally defined by reference to the 
likelihood that liability would induce beneficial changes in 
activity. It becomes apparent for example that the employer 
should not be made liable for a tort committed by the em-
ployee . . . [when there is very low probability that the em-
ployer] would substantially reduce the likelihood of such a 
tort.40 
It is apparent that Posner did incorporate the argument that  
activity-level considerations should be applied on both sides. If 
noncommuters know they can be compensated by even nonnegli-
gent commuters, with no corresponding risk of paying for similar 
harms they themselves cause, they will engage in too much driv-
ing. Note that Posner avoids the conventional and simplistic 
thinking regarding strict liability in favor of some faith in the 
common law. When other judges, including Cardozo and  
Calabresi, might have used the case to expand strict liability, and 
when most judges would have abided by the rule that commuting 
activity is always outside the scope of employment, Posner al-
lowed the case to go forward against the employer. However, he 
did so in a way that teaches other judges how to think about strict 
liability. Posner’s strategy here, as in so many other cases, was to 
use the case as an opportunity to interpret inherited law as effi-
ciency enhancing and then to make modest changes consistent 
with this efficiency-minded approach.41 
In another well-known torts case, Indiana Harbor Belt  
Railroad Co v American Cyanamid Co,42 Posner again resisted 
the opportunity to follow conventional and mistaken economics. 
In this case, he refused to deploy strict liability, though it was 
arguably called for by conventional tort law’s rule—that a “dan-
gerous” activity be governed by strict liability43—because doing so 
would discourage plaintiffs from searching out negligent parties 
 
 40 Id at 1210–11. 
 41 See, for example, Posner’s reframing of the traditional negligence standard in 
Brotherhood Shipping Co, Ltd v St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co, 985 F2d 323, 327 
(7th Cir 1993), or his distinction between punitive and restitutionary damages paid in case 
of “efficient” copyright infringement in Bucklew v Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co, 329 F3d 
923, 931–32 (7th Cir 2003). 
 42 916 F2d 1174 (7th Cir 1990). 
 43 See, for example, Rylands v Fletcher, LR 3 HL 330, 339–40 (1868), affirming 
Fletcher v Rylands, LR 1 Ex 265 (1866); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520. 
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who caused their harm. The case involved the allocation of 
cleanup costs following a spill from a railroad car.44 Posner recog-
nized that imposing strict liability on the manufacturer and ship-
per of chemicals, American Cyanamid, could be justified by the 
long-standing rule attaching strict liability to a dangerous prod-
uct. Strict liability might control the amount and location of 
travel. But Posner argued that the default rule of negligence is 
adequate for the job in this case, and he noted that any of three 
other parties’ negligence might have caused the spill.45 Thus, even 
if strict liability has an activity-level effect, it is useful to revert 
to the negligence inquiry in order to deter a plaintiff’s or a third 
party’s negligent behavior. Posner declines to force American  
Cyanamid to bear the cleanup costs because it was not negligent, 
and another party might well have been at fault.  
Again, a negligence rule gives both parties an incentive to be-
have in a desirable way. A strict liability rule puts all the burden 
on one side (assuming no contributory negligence) when a pro-
spective plaintiff or another tortfeasor might be the superior cost-
avoider. Posner again discovers and advances the cause of negli-
gence when the law-and-economics approach might have been ex-
pected to favor strict liability. He finds new beauty in old law and 
thus outshines or refines Cardozo’s reasoning. Posner sees that 
when multiple causal agents are in play, a strict liability rule at-
tached to just one of several involved parties would give another 
injured party no incentive to point to negligence on the part of a 
third party. In such settings, the law ought to look first for negli-
gence and only then, if there is none, deploy strict liability if that 
will affect the activity level of the party most likely to assess po-
tential accidents and adjust its activity level accordingly. 
In sum, Posner’s tort law cases sometimes restrain the ex-
pansion of strict liability even when conventional economic think-
ing and moral intuitions favor it.46 He came early to conclusions 




 44 Indiana Harbor, 916 F2d at 1175. 
 45 Id at 1179. 
 46 See Stephen G. Gilles, 21 J Legal Stud at 333 (cited in note 17). 
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III.  POSNER AND THE DECLINE OF THE COMMON LAW  
(IN MATTERS OF PRIVATE LAW) 
If Cardozo’s opinions are read generously—as I have encour-
aged elsewhere47—then Posner is a distinguished runner-up in 
the competition for the most influential judge in tort law, though 
Posner deserves credit for the openness of his decisions as op-
posed to Cardozo’s obfuscation. Posner was simply too late to take 
the prize. Cardozo operated in the era of the common law, but by 
Posner’s time the federal government was much larger, its stat-
utes and agencies were ubiquitous, and the reach of federal con-
stitutional law was also greater. In the Posner period, as com-
pared to the Cardozo age, the federal courts (like law reviews) 
devoted far more effort to public law, and constitutional law in 
particular, and much less attention to torts, contracts, trusts and 
estates, and other private law matters. Posner himself might be 
best known for his public law decisions, as discussed elsewhere.48 
In the domain of private law, Posner operated at a time when the 
judiciary invested in statutory interpretation rather than com-
mon law decision-making.49 Legislatures had taken over many 
fields, and law was expected to produce rules rather than stand-
ards and, more generally, to solve problems rather than to leave 
them to markets, evolutionary pressure, and common law  
decision-making. The golden age of the common law had ended. 
Judges were (and remain) evaluated on the basis of their consti-
tutional law and administrative law decisions. It is worth consid-
ering whether this was inevitable and whether Posner could have 
reversed the decline of the common law. 
 
 47 Saul Levmore, The Wagon Mound Cases: Foreseeability, Causation, and Mrs. 
Palsgraf, in Robert L. Rabin and Stephen D. Sugarman, eds, Torts Stories 129–50  
(Foundation 2003). 
 48 Posner has written extensively on issues of public law, particularly with respect 
to intelligence agencies. See generally, for example, Richard A. Posner, Uncertain Shield: 
The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform (Rowman & Littlefield 2006); Richard 
A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 (Rowman 
& Littlefield 2005); Richard A. Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence (Hoover 2005). 
Posner’s prolific public law canon also includes Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and 
Democracy (Harvard 2003) (representative democracy); Richard A. Posner, Sex and  
Reason (Harvard 1992) (sexuality and reproduction); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation 
of the Market in Adoptions, 67 BU L Rev 59 (1987) (adoption and family law). 
 49 This may or may not be because of the Erie doctrine, as previously mentioned in 
the text accompanying note 2. 
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The common law’s decline can be traced to several things. 
The first is the growth of the full-time judiciary and of govern-
ment itself.50 In turn, this growth can be explained by public 
choice theory and is therefore a topic beyond the scope of the pre-
sent Essay. It is apparent that interest groups more often seek 
government involvement than they do government neutrality. 
There is something of a predictable pattern to the subjects left 
untouched by government and thus open to credible political 
promises. Another strike against the common law is that it prom-
ises change in a world in which citizens and businesses think they 
want legal certainty.51 Legislatures are perhaps more inclined to 
provide certainty, both because serious changes might be re-
garded as takings, triggering payment or discouraging change, 
and simply because interest groups are more likely to form to pro-
tect against losses than they are to organize to acquire new ben-
efits. Identifiable losers will organize more than inexperienced 
and often uncertain winners.52 This is ironic and debatable be-
cause on the surface it is judges who follow precedent and thus 
promise certainty. Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, the 
remarkable growth of arbitration has meant a reduced role for 
courts in the domains previously occupied by the common law.53 
If private parties take their disputes to less expensive, better in-
formed, and more reliable private dispute-resolution mecha-
nisms, there is less opportunity for common law evolution. Had 
judges been paid by the piece, they might have competed with 
private arbitrators, but instead judges have welcomed arbitra-
tion, perhaps because it reduces their workload or allows them to 
avoid areas in which they have little expertise. It should be noted 
that arbitration is usually unavailable or shunned by one or both 
 
 50 See Neal Devins and David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U Pa 
L Rev 595, 624–25 (2017) (emphasizing the growth of the administrative state and how 
this, in combination with other factors including the proliferation of law clerks and lower 
courts’ embrace of judicial hierarchy, is at odds with the common law style of judging). 
 51 See Frederick Schauer, 36 Ariz St L J at 779–81 (cited in note 5). 
 52 See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J Legal Stud 259, 
274 (1999). 
 53 See Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Common 
Law, 2 J Am Arbitration 1, 14–15 (2003), archived at http://perma.cc/Z4GU-7JNG 
(focusing on consumer protection law); David L. Noll, Arbitration Conflicts, 103 Minn L 
Rev 665, 670–74 (2018) (discussing the regulation of arbitration and its rise in several 
specific areas). 
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parties for matters associated with public law.54 Either may seek 
to establish precedent, and that is not something arbitration of-
fers. More generally, the decision in a private law case is likely to 
be context specific; an arbitrator can look into the facts of the case, 
and precedent would in any event be less valuable than it is in 
public law matters. 
In short, Posner’s talents and influence were constrained be-
cause his capacity for unpredictable analysis and judging was 
precisely the sort of thing that shifted power from judges to legis-
latures and agencies. In many areas of law, judges can be seen as 
competitors of legislatures and their agencies. At the very least, 
the two branches are alternative means of addressing private and 
social problems. Legislatures often act slowly, whereas a single 
judge can innovate at the request of an energetic litigant. This 
innovation can then spread through the judiciary and seem suffi-
ciently sensible and effective that legislatures and agencies stay 
away or codify what the judge has advanced. 
This last point suggests that an activist and confident judge 
can innovate where legislatures fear to tread. These matters are 
most likely to be found when changes in technology, demography, 
or scientific understanding bring about new questions for law or 
a rethinking of old rules. Consider, for example, the challenge of 
climate change. The phenomenon is widely thought to require in-
ternational cooperation—and thus global negotiations followed by 
legislative action.55 At the same time, and especially in a large 
economy like the United States, there is room for national and 
local precautions. Climate change is anticipated to impact citi-
zens unevenly, and there are groups eager to support candidates 
who offer ameliorative regulations, subsidies for relocation, or 
other means of changing business and personal behavior. Legis-
lators are likely to respond to the threat with statutes and rules 
regulating emissions and land use, and they may promise to ex-
pend resources in order to encourage cleaner energy usage or 
shifts in production and residential practices. The problem is po-
litical, intergenerational, and international—and therefore of 
growing interest to politicians and especially to insurgents.  
 
 54 See Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of 
Law, 2016 U Ill L Rev 371, 391 (noting that the Court historically held that Congress did 
not intend public law causes of action to be arbitrated). 
 55 See, for example, David Ciplet, Rethinking Cooperation: Inequality and Consent 
in International Climate Change Politics, 21 Global Governance 247, 253–55 (2015)  
(acknowledging the need for international cooperation in climate change policy). 
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It could have been otherwise. Just as environmental condi-
tions are increasingly subjects of public law, influenced by legis-
latures and sometimes restricted by courts, tort law could have 
been used by aggressive litigants and courts to respond to the 
threat of climate change. With some changes in rules of standing 
and the measurement of damages, courts might have allowed 
suits against developers who eliminated trees or used one form of 
energy rather than another. As the planet warms, judges might 
take the lead in avoiding disaster by imposing liability on those 
who engage in antisocial activity, broadly defined. But this is the 
sort of judicial activism that requires a Cardozo or a Posner. 
Cardozo was on the scene before climate change was recognized, 
and Posner, or at least the early Posner, hesitated to tread where 
administrative agencies had failed even to investigate.56 It is pos-
sible that as agencies and legislatures failed to take dramatic 
steps despite growing awareness of climate change, Posner would 
have used tort law to address the problem if given the opportunity 
by insightful and daring litigants. Courts have rarely addressed 
climate change head on,57 but if Posner served another ten years, 
things might be different. Had he had the opportunity to address 
 
 56 See, for example, Cronin v United States Department of Agriculture, 919 F2d 439, 
444 (7th Cir 1990) (“Administrative agencies deal with technical questions, and it is 
imprudent for the generalist judges of the federal district courts and courts of appeals to 
consider testimonial and documentary evidence bearing on those questions unless the 
evidence has first been presented to and considered by the agency.”). 
 57 One obvious exception is American Electric Power Co, Inc v Connecticut, 564 US 
410, 422, 429 (2011), in which claims were brought by a number of states and land trusts 
against American Electric for contributing to the alleged public nuisance of global warm-
ing. While the Supreme Court found that any federal nuisance claim was precluded by the 
existence of federal legislation on emissions regulation, it nevertheless was divided on the 
issue of Article III standing by the claimants and declined to determine the availability of 
state nuisance claims. Id at 420. A number of courts have since taken on the question of 
environmental nuisance claims, including the Seventh Circuit. See, for example, Michigan 
v United States Army Corps of Engineers, 758 F3d 892, 898 (7th Cir 2014) (finding avail-
ability of nuisance claims despite failure to allege sufficient evidence of public nuisance in 
the instant case); Washington Environmental Council v Bellon, 732 F3d 1131, 1141–46 
(9th Cir 2013) (finding that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient causal nexus to substanti-
ate nuisance claim); Merrick v Diageo Americas Supply, Inc, 805 F3d 685, 695 (6th Cir 
2015) (finding that plaintiffs were not precluded from bringing common law nuisance 
claims for emissions under the Clean Air Act). Finally, Juliana v United States, 217 F 
Supp 3d 1224 (D Or 2016), may be a sign that “new era” cases will eventually find some 
courts willing to address climate change when the other branches of government have 
avoided either action or open rejection. Id at 1261 (denying a motion to dismiss in a case 
alleging substantive due process violations on the basis that the federal government has 
failed to adequately respond to the threats of climate change). See also David Markell, 
Can Non-statutory Federal Climate Litigation Drive Federal Climate Policy? (ABA, Nov 9, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/K527-TCBY. 
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the growing problem, Posner would have undeniably been the 
most influential tort law judge in history. He was on the bench a 
bit too early for this to occur. 
Posner was not too early to take up the contemporary chal-
lenge of income inequality. But here too the legislature is firmly 
in control, and indeed Posner as an academic had argued that pri-
vate law is not the proper engine for wealth redistribution.58 It 
would have been surprising if his judicial decisions innovated in 
a way that was inconsistent with his academic writing. In any 
event, it is hard to imagine judges openly deciding cases as a 
means of bringing about large-scale wealth redistribution. 
A more plausible counterfactual claim is that, with more 
time, Posner would have had great influence on the development 
of autonomous vehicles. These vehicles promise to reduce the 
costs of road accidents and deaths, but their development depends 
in part on changes in law, and tort law in particular. A judge (or 
legislature) with Posnerian courage and confidence might find a 
company negligent for not converting its fleet to autonomous ve-
hicles. Again, a strict liability rule might do this painlessly—
though there is the question of whether a victim could also have 
switched to a self-driving vehicle or other technology. Autono-
mous vehicles raise many such questions on a smaller scale. 
There will be accidents between these vehicles, and between con-
ventional and autonomous cars, and there will be traffic delays 
caused by imperfect software. If we are willing to bring activity 
levels into the negligence calculus, it might simply be negligent 
not to recycle one’s owner-controlled vehicle and switch to an au-
tonomous transport. At present, it seems that these questions will 
be decided by legislatures. It might have been very different, and 
probably better, if Posner’s brilliance and fearless judicial char-
acter had continued to influence law. 
 
 
 58 See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 Notre Dame J L, Ethics 
& Pub Pol 85, 104–05 (1985). 
